As touched on briefly above, the data from the Kosovo UNV Job Satisfaction Survey present an unexpected paradox. While I initially expected to gauge the dissatisfaction of UNVs (based on my earlier conversations which revealed persistent complaints from fellow Volunteers), the data from the questionnaire outlined a more complicated scenario. Eighty-three percent of UNVs reported moderate to extreme levels of work satisfaction, while a high percentage simultaneously listed complaints ranging from UNV discrimination to under-support to inadequate training and preparation of Volunteers. This apparently contradictory data may be explained in part through other positive aspects of work life for UNVs (including a generous volunteer stipend which rivals the more competitive salaries of Western NGOs), the charged political climate in Kosovo, or other rewards or perceptions that may weigh in favor of UNV work satisfaction. My own experience as a UNV in Kosovo suggests that the environment of international politics and humanitarian work was an important determinant of work satisfaction. The UNV Job Satisfaction Questionnaire did not inquire as to the exact nature of this paradox, and I make no firm assertion in this regard.
UNV should not rest lightly, however, in the apparent satisfaction of its Kosovo Volunteers. In fact, issues specifically within control of the UNV organization appear by this research to be critically lacking, and are detrimental not only to the credibility of the UNV program, but to the overall success of the UN Mission in Kosovo.
United Nations Volunteers in Kosovo may be largely satisfied with their work experience, however they make serious and specific allegations about the broader context in which they work. Given the open opportunity to describe the most significant negative aspects of the UNV work experience, nearly one-third of survey participants (31.5%) complained about some level of discrimination because of their status as UN Volunteers. One UNV respondent echoed many of his colleagues in his questionnaire: "I felt that I was not being treated as a professional, but like somebody (who) was doing an unimportant job." A number of Volunteers described feeling like second-rate or second-class staff members, given little respect by their professional colleagues.
The same percentage of respondents (31.5%) also described poor administrative support as one of the most significant negative aspects of their experience (1). One UNV felt that he was "not...guided of the proper procedures, guidelines, and opportunities within the organization." Another admonished, "when UNV in Bonn decides to send so many UNVs in a mission, they should set up a proper support unit in terms of evaluations." Other UNVs complained in less specific terms of poor UNV support, further reinforcing the perception among many Volunteers that the level of support afforded them, administrative and otherwise, is deficient.
From all fifty-four respondents, only one reported receiving trainings in all of the areas in question (i.e. United Nations organizational overview, socio-political situation in Kosovo, culture shock, burnout (and prevention), and foreign language); from the remaining fifty-three, less than fifteen percent received trainings in more than two of these areas. UNV guidelines call for a total seven to ten days of training, which should cover most of the topics mentioned in the UNV survey; based on the unique climate in Kosovo, other subjects such as burnout and culture shock, while not mandatory within the UNV list, certainly qualify as "appropriate other types of training in exceptional circumstances."
Literature shows that a comprehensive training package, like the one described above, has an important impact on the mental, physical, and emotional preparedness of employees in an international setting. This preparedness is not only vital for the well being of the Volunteer, but also for the well being of the programs and clients which he or she serves. UNV has, in theory, the foundation for successful Volunteer preparation within their guidelines; based on these data, however, these instructions are paid little attention, if not utterly ignored.
Another significant issue deserving review is the nature of professional hiring within the UN Mission in Kosovo. More than a fifth of the survey respondents (20.4%) complained about the so-called eighteen-month rule, and other factors that gave the impression of non-transparent hiring practices. The eighteen-month rule began late in 1999, and stated that UNVs must have completed a minimum of eighteen months of service to be even considered for professional posts in the mission. Ironically, consideration for professional posts in other UN missions (e.g. East Timor) was granted to UNVs who had completed only 12 months of service. One Volunteer sharply described his frustration with the rule in the open-ended response of the UNV survey: "the rules for UNVs in Kosovo prevent them from applying for professional contracts until after eighteen months, but they can apply for professional contracts elsewhere after twelve months?! We are good enough for East Timor but not good enough for Kosovo?" Another UNV pointed out that "the rigid eighteen-month rule...in my opinion causes UN to lose valuable people." One Volunteer was upset that "non-UNVs, having the same qualifications and no field experience, have been selected for professional posts instead of UNVs who have spent months in the mission and have applied for the same post." The so-called eighteen-month rule, though possibly a good idea to deter professional climbers, may in fact prevent well qualified candidates from receiving appropriate UN professional positions; simultaneously, the rule may result in the replacement of field-tested Volunteers by professional staff without adequate or appropriate regional experience.
This phenomenon closely correlates to the data regarding interest in professional UN employment. More than eighty-five percent of participants are either somewhat (27.8%) or greatly (57.4%) interested in professional UN employment. A similar number of respondents report that their level of job satisfaction would increase greatly (55.6%) or somewhat (29.6%), just knowing that there was an opportunity for professional employment for them with the United Nations. The converse implication is not favorable for the UNV Program: given the choice, this high percentage of UNVs would opt for professional status over that of Volunteer. Reasons for professional interest in the UN may appear self-evident, but an organization whose members strive in great number for other employment must find difficulty in claiming success.
Without possibility for professional advancement because of the eighteen-month rule, it is not a surprise that more than two-thirds (35.2% somewhat inclined, 33.3% very inclined) of survey participants would be inclined to extend their UNV service if the volunteer living allowance (VLA) for UNVs were subject to increases based on job performance or years of service. While the UNV program may see this as a problematic option, since VLA is not intended as a salary, but only a stipend to defray expenses, creative strategies should be developed to demonstrate organizational respect for committed and successful Volunteers. Without the possibility for professional advancement in virtually all cases, such alternative strategies could prove vital to maintain the UNV's desire to stay within the organization.
The UNV Program has been repeatedly described to Volunteers as a branch of the UN for committed individuals interested in upholding the ideals of volunteerism, and not a stepping-stone to UN professional employment. The data here show that regardless of this organizational ideal, UNVs in Kosovo indeed have a strong interest in entering the ranks of professional UN staff, and are frustrated by these barriers to advancement. These Volunteers often have specific and appropriate field experience and advanced educational levels which would otherwise qualify them for consideration for United Nations professional posts. In many cases, they are not only ineligible for professional positions, but are also discriminated against based on their status as Volunteers. This combination of discrimination and professional ineligibility creates an unsolvable dilemma: UNVs covet professional posts they cannot have, and simultaneously do not receive sufficient respect in the roles they do have.
With approximately 800 present and former UNVs in the Kosovo mission (from June 1999 to present), 54 responses reflect at least 6.8% of the total population (though as of March 2001, there were 240 UNVs in the mission, and the 23 responses from the second round of data represent 9.6% of that group). This significant percentage suggests the possibility of hundreds of UNVs in Kosovo having received inadequate preparatory training and insufficient support. Compounded with broad claims of UNV discrimination within the mission, it is clear that a UNV program evaluation and overhaul are due. UNVs in Kosovo are confronted on many sides with conditions that actively hinder their well being and peer respect. Accordingly, though satisfied with the work in which they are involved, UNVs view many of those aspects specifically related to their UNV status with frustration and even disdain.
Seen in the broader context of internationally assisted development - where a society, torn by years of violence and ethnic hatred, is beholden to international outsiders to shepherd its tenuous growth - the implications of this under-support, lack of adequate training, and discrimination are indeed troubling. UNVs in Kosovo make up a large percentage of the UN workforce in the province; this team is charged with the profound responsibility to develop and cooperate with a complex and scarred society. The findings here indicate a lack of sufficient practical concern for these high aims, and an irresponsible regard for the UN mandate in Kosovo.
Special Considerations and Issues
As I began my research to investigate the job satisfaction of the Kosovo UNV, I understandably devoted a portion of my background reading to the issue of volunteerism. Throughout my reading, I continuously felt that we UNVs were not, in the traditional sense, volunteers. A standard definition of volunteer refers to work done of one's free will (2). By this understanding alone, it is clear that despite the organizational title, UNVs are not volunteers. UNVs in Kosovo are paid at least $33,000 per year, including various entitlements (3). According to the responses, many UNVs even considered their positions more paid job than volunteer or simply, paid job.
This view of the non-volunteer became so intriguing that for some time I considered devoting the major portion of my paper to its analysis. I went so far as to interpret the word "volunteer" into other official UN languages (Spanish and French; Chinese, Russian, and Arabic would follow), to determine if the same connotation of free will is denoted in the intercultural context as well. I sensed that I was on to something big. My next step involved research of average salaries by nation; I felt that by showing the VLA was higher than per capita GNP of every nation represented in my research, that I could effectively debunk the Volunteer myth. Again my research supported my objective: according to World Bank data from 1999, Americans (with one of the highest per capita GNP of all countries in my survey) made less on average ($30,600) than UN Volunteers in Kosovo. A resounding "Eureka!" - threatening to shake the UNV Organization, and Organizational Management think-tanks to their core? No. A misguided foray on my part.
The title UN Volunteer somehow implied to me less than professional, possibly because of my own feelings of discrimination within the UN Mission in Kosovo. In this vein, my admittedly indulgent foray was an effort to refute the perception. It soon became clear that the entire "Professional or Volunteer" question is a red herring. To exert energies and prove that UNVs are not in fact volunteers in the traditional sense is to miss the point entirely. Volunteer or professional, the underlying objective of these UN workers is the same - that is, to effectively support the broad mandate of the UN Mission in Kosovo, as it attempts to nurture and develop a complex and broken society. This objective is of far greater significance than the hair-splitting semantics in which I had briefly engaged. As such, it is of highest importance that each individual called upon to support this mission be well prepared and well supported, if he or she is to effectively contribute to these goals.
Conclusions and Recommendations |
